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    Join in the discussion on majority / supermajority voting, liquid democracy, futarchy / prediction markets, US-style constitutional republicanism / separation of powers, benevolent dictators, foundations etc. where decisions may be made by human negotiated consensus, AI algorithms, voting, betting, hashing power, longest chain or flame wars.
    Rhys Lindmark
    @RhysLindmark_twitter

    Hi all! Thanks for setting this up, Brendan.

    (Also, hi @lkngtn! Glad to see you here as well :)

    Luke Duncan
    @lkngtn
    Hey Rhys, hopefully this channel takes off. Governance is so critical for decentralization and there is definitely not enough discussion and attention focused on it!
    👍
    Brendan@Reflexivity
    @rflxvty_twitter
    Hi Guys. Thanks for joining. I'll put up another post over the next few days. In the meantime I'll add some links. Reto - is there anything you can tell us about the Melonport governance progress? If doesn't have to be for the Q1 release. It could be some more complex issues for later releases.
    Brendan@Reflexivity
    @rflxvty_twitter
    What really made me sit up was how many of the projects he references are still getting their heads around governance. When I wrote the Melonport report it was great to see a project that were ahead of schedule with governance. But I do wonder if that will be the case for all projects.
    And this one was really interesting because I hadn't realised the founding fathers in the US spent so much time thinking about possible threats to a governance model. https://medium.com/@BuckPerley/crypto-governance-f1318affbbe0
    Brendan@Reflexivity
    @rflxvty_twitter
    I also like the fact that it argues foe the status quo in Bitcoin governance or at least it suggests that a change resistant approach is best. But BTC is 8 years old and there is a lot of wealth already on the line so maybe it can start to be more conservative. Other projects may warrant more experimental approaches.
    And this one is interesting on cognitive biases and a few other ideas: https://medium.com/metacurrency-project/broken-assumptions-of-governance-63cc946ccc6c
    And yes at some point I will add these links (and others from Coinfund in the initial Twitter exchange) onto a single page.
    Brendan@Reflexivity
    @rflxvty_twitter
    Luke / Maria - I've always seen Aragon as governance for companies / DAOs. Smaller groups of people that need to coordinate, agree how they make decisions, split equity etc. I've seen this as separate from project governance - where there are potentially tens or hundreds of thousands of interested parties wanting a say in how things are run. Do you guys see this split? Or is the intention to build something that scales to very large groups, perhaps even millions of people? In the Zurrer approach (as per above) the intention is to give keepers a lot of power and potentially these are smaller groups (say hundreds), and maybe more centralized, so this might be something that you guys can scale to without too many changes. Any thoughts on this?
    Alex Bulkin
    @alex-coinfund
    Hi everyone
    @rflxvty_twitter have you created the page with all the links yet?
    Brendan@Reflexivity
    @rflxvty_twitter
    No - not yet. Stick anything you can think of here for now. Started the book you guys recommended - great stuff - certainty feeds into aligning incentives... https://equilibriabook.com/
    And welcome by the way :-) thanks for joining.
    That goes for everyone. Please spread the word.
    Luke Duncan
    @lkngtn

    @rflxvty_twitter the intention at Aragon is to create a modular approach to organization governance, that way there does not need to be a one size fits all approach and new mecanisms can be created and sill work with existing infrastructure. So for example instead of using the basic voting application to make decisions, a delegative/liquid democracy application may be created and used insead, and it would still have all the same benefits of being able to interact with the vault and payroll applications that have already been built on (AragonOS)[https://wiki.aragon.one/dev/AragonOS/].

    The long term strategy for Aragon is to create an opt-in digital jurisidiction, the value of which would largely be determined by whether the jurisidiction is effectively governed. We are very much commited to building governance mechanisms that work beyond simple organizations, and are particularly interested in creating solutions which work well for blockchain networks.

    From a product management perspective the best way to do that is to work directly with potential users, so we are reaching out directly to projects to help us identitfy and prioritize specific mechanisms and working with them to safely test and transition governance over to token holders by progressively granting more authority to these voting mechanism as we become comfortable with the results.

    Griff Green
    @GriffGreen
    ^^^ this is the right approach IMO
    There is no single decentralized governance structure that will work for all orgs. We need to just keep building tools to let groups experiment
    And out of these experiments we will learn a lot... hopefully we will land on a few decentralized governance structures that can compete with a benevolent dictatorship :-D
    Brendan@Reflexivity
    @rflxvty_twitter
    Yes I agree it should be modular and it's not one size fits all. And yes so many ideas that are worth trying. My goal with the blog posts over the next few weeks is to make the trade offs a little more accessible to project teams. I'm in New York for Consensus Invest tomorrow so if there is anyone you think I should reach out to that would be great.
    Rhys Lindmark
    @RhysLindmark_twitter
    Luke Duncan
    @lkngtn
    Not sure what happened to the first link, I think it got deleted and republished: https://medium.com/@FEhrsam/blockchain-governance-programming-our-future-c3bfe30f2d74
    I think he wanted the url to match the title.
    Definitely worth the read! Very insightful post.
    Griff Green
    @GriffGreen
    https://youtu.be/9RtSod8EXn4?t=2h33m58s I thought this was great... I love the vocab he creates
    Griff Green
    @GriffGreen
    http://www.reinventingorganizationswiki.com/ another great resource (Thx for the reminder that i need to read this @RhysLindmark_twitter :-D
    Rhys Lindmark
    @RhysLindmark_twitter
    :smile: All the teal, all the time.
    Brendan@Reflexivity
    @rflxvty_twitter
    Brendan@Reflexivity
    @rflxvty_twitter
    Worth getting to the bottom of what the Ethereum process is. I'd be happy to volunteer to document it. Reto from Melonport referred me to Carbon Vote (http://carbonvote.com/) used during DAO hack, Yellow Paper Committee (Gavin Wood) and Ethereum Improvement Process. I tend to agree that trying to cut node operators out of the hard fork process is not going to work. Ont he other hand Zurrer (see video above) sees node operators (keepers) as having a bigger role.
    Carl Youngblood
    @cayblood
    I've been thinking for a while how cool it would be to start a company focused on providing governance solutions to failed states. One of the first things I think you would need to do is prioritize features. What are the most critical aspects of a functioning democracy that you would want to build first?
    Brendan@Reflexivity
    @rflxvty_twitter
    Hi Carl. Welcome. Just a gentle reminder that we'd like to keep this forum for discussions on governance for public, permissionless blockchains. There will no doubt be relevant ideas from failed states etc. so by all means introduce them in the context of blockchain governance. In fact my intro blog post was just that. It will be challenging to discuss this when so many people in the blockchain world come from such diverse political backgrounds. Almost all governance decisions will create winners and losers in economic terms. But yeah it seems attractive to search for a minimum viable product (MVP) of governance. In fact each network is already doing that. Where there is online governance it's usually explicitly marked as an experiment, with some fail back to offline governance by founders / advisors. It'll be interested to see when we get to a first definition of an MVP, what will we have left out? What are "the critical aspects of a functioning democracy"? And if we can leave bits out temporarily does that mean we can leave them our permanently? In blockchain it seems like we can have offline governance as a catch all. I think this works for now as it's a positive sum game in a growing space. So things are on the whole a little more good natured. It gets trickier when that growth stops - and people are more acutely aware of what they are gaining / losing with each decision being made. My take is the time for MVPs will run out faster than we think. And no network is protected: the irony has been pointed out before, but the ones that thought most about governance (Tezos, Otonomous), are finding their their chosen MVP model for governance was flawed. Web3 is growing 2-3 times faster than Web1. Failed states are usually those that failed to respond to change. Only networks with governance models that facilitate change will adopt fast enough. So I think there is a distinction here: we already have somewhat fragile MVPs, but there is now an urgency to find the MVPs of more robust governance models.
    Brendan@Reflexivity
    @rflxvty_twitter
    Time to scope out those Aragon tools: https://blog.aragon.one/introducing-aragon-nest-1aa8c91c0566
    Johannes Jensen
    @LocalCurrents
    Hi Everyone! Great idea creating a channel for this exciting topic. I am currently preparing an article on the topic invoking a new methodology for distributed governance models inspired by German philosophers Niklas Luhmann and Jürgen Habermas. Super exciting to see the many interesting angles to solving these emerging issues.
    Luke Duncan
    @lkngtn
    Thought the group here might find this post I just published interesting: https://blog.aragon.one/thoughts-on-governance-and-network-effects-f40fda3e3f98
    Thoughts and feedback very much appreciated! :)
    Rhys Lindmark
    @RhysLindmark_twitter

    Generally dig the direction (governance token = defensible). I'd mention the "blockchain-enabled early adopter financial incentives" to your thoughts at the top on diminished network effects: https://medium.com/@RhysLindmark/macro-blockchain-1-the-end-of-aggregation-theory-ad199a0c03d8

    Also, I'd love to see a follow up on the experiments happening with various governance models that you describe.

    Luke Duncan
    @lkngtn
    @RhysLindmark_twitter me too! I think each of those modes deserves a whole deep dive, and very excited to get some implementations out into the wild that can be tested an analyzed.
    Luke Duncan
    @lkngtn
    Regarding early adopter financial incentives, I think its a powerful force but ultimately begs the question how do you make it sustainable in the longer term? Personally I think that line of thinking leads straight to a crypto universal basic income (which I’m a huge fan of), but I think jumping straight to that conclusion skips too many intermediary steps and takes focus away from what the immediate next steps are…
    Rhys Lindmark
    @RhysLindmark_twitter
    Yeah, I'm not really arguing for cryptoUBI, just arguing that part of the reason for diminished defensibility (increased exit) are those early adopter financial incentives.
    Luke Duncan
    @lkngtn
    definitely!
    Brendan@Reflexivity
    @rflxvty_twitter
    @lkngtn great post. And great feedback Rhys - made me go through the agg theory idea again to see how tokens / decentralization / governance might impact the theory. You both spurred me into action to get my post out. Hopefully I'll get it out tomorrow.