Governance models for public, permissionless, blockchain-based networks.
@geleeroyale:matrix.org ;-)
Video is here for those who missed it: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=no8fB2cZ--g
- I really think exiting is over-rated as a concept in governance.
- Nick Szabo was wrong to say that we shouldn't design governance systems because open source governance models will be fine.
- Gitter is weird and replaces 2 with 1 when you do a list like this.
- It also replaces 3 with 1 and probably four
Three - we have to sort out this idea that it's OK to have "one token - one vote" governance. Surely u don't have to be a genius to see where that ends up when you have liquid token markets.
Four - the answer to three can't be removing pseudonymity. It may be a form of complex interactions between liquid democracy, with some strong reputation system for delegates combined with sortition, where we randomly select people to act as a citizen's assembly.
Six - so the solutions I am talking about are for massive scale public permissionless networks with very real network effects that make exiting very painful. In theory a citizen can rip up their passport but it doesn't get them anywhere they want to be. Leaving a network of millions or billions of users, dapps, business partners, friends, your favourite AI bots etc. and waiting for everyone to join you could be financially prohibitive if all your income comes from the old network.
Seven - it's not on-chain vs off-chain either - it's always a complex web of checks and balances.
Nine - I really want to get to the bottom of n^2 vs nlogn vs n vs logn. Which networks will have global scale and what are their network effects - so we can quantify the real pain of exiting.
Hi everyone,
my name is Matan Field, working on DAOstack (www.daostack.io), previously worked on La'Zooz and Backfeed. Decentralized governance protocols (and platforms) was my main topic of research (and dev) for the past 4 years. (Before that have worked on a postdoc in string theory.)
This is a first in a series of blogposts about decentralized governance, DAOs and DAOstack:
https://medium.com/daostack/decentralized-governance-first-principles-1fc6eaa492ed
I would love any feedback, questions and other interest, here or privately matan@daostack.io .
maybe around lunch Friday or Saturday?
hey @rflxvty_twitter , looking forward to your feedback; perhaps by then i'll have the second post out ;)
Some ongoing Twitter discussions... Kyle Samani argues centralised governance wins out for now (https://twitter.com/KyleSamani/status/968308830408007680) ... Chris Burniske suggests we need ID and private voting here: https://twitter.com/cburniske/status/968974019700707329 ... and nice ideas from Chris here... https://twitter.com/cburniske/status/968829591421898757 ... love the line from Joel Monegro: "@jmonegro coined a cool phrase to represent an appreciating value of governance as a cryptonetwork scales: increasing marginal cost of consensus." In a world of zero marginal cost products - it does seem like governance cost per user will rise with the size of the network ... and Nick Szabo added this comment: https://twitter.com/NickSzabo4/status/964212372624703488 ... "we can think of governance as having an argument surface: the more kinds of decisions there are to argue over, the less functional the institution will be." ... Distense recommends (https://twitter.com/distenseorg/status/966758155219685376) this post from the IETF: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7282.txt
A couple more links on governance... I like the Decred approach for timestamped proposals... https://github.com/decred/politeia/ ... also we definitely need a governance conference, so anyone who is in a position to support Tim Bansemer in his efforts should do so: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1dm4XWTmdjZ1TDWAnnaIWpZ3fVWQMue8K3C2SrP89VVw/edit#
Some good point-counterpoint posts on governance from Vitalik and Daniel Larimer. Vitalik argues for systems that provide economic incentives for good governance with the actual decision making off-chain. Larimer argues that decision making on issues of 'right and wrong' are inherently subjective, and that relying only on cryptoeconomic incentives for governance will not be enough.
Vitalik's post: https://vitalik.ca/general/2018/03/28/plutocracy.html
reminds me of @rflxvty_twitter 's posts from the beginning of the year that governance will always be a mix of consensus design and 'soft' forms of debate that will be the most effective forms of overall network governance
Here is a new project I'm working on called Consensus Clubs. The intention is to reinventing early-stage capital by bringing together ideas from curation markets, bonding curves, DAOs, investing clubs, PoS-style and staking / slashing. The plan is to build in a governance engine to support lots of different governance models for clubs. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_tsRYjHX0Oc
If you think it's worth doing then please like the video - as we're trying to get to Hong Kong for the EOS hackathon.
Hi Brendan@Reflexivity looks like a good concept, especially as I am looking for investment for a project to decentralise the loyalty rewards industry. Have liked the video.
Great post by the scholars at RMIT. I just bumped into Jason Potts minutes ago at Consensus! https://medium.com/@cryptoeconomics/crypto-constitutionalism-c25d0c503ac?source=linkShare-b13262b21fc0-1526494447
Thank you @orbl for the prod: here is a first stab... https://github.com/rflxvty/decentralized-governance